Improving HSM Efficiency, Management and Monitoring

Given the number and variety of security hardware modules (HSM) used by financial services to support cryptographic services, it can be difficult to determine the working conditions, performance, performance, performance, performance, and use of each HSM. This is a central management and monitoring issue. For project architects, it is very expensive and time consuming to design systems using HSM, creating cryptographic infrastructure from scratch in each new project and integrating with the HSM API.

As with many banks, developers don’t have all the experience they need to work with different HSM, even if they’re supported by well-trained security professionals. Preventing design errors, implementation delays, and conflicts with internal auditors reduces project time and saves resources. The main problem facing banks is maintaining proper management of encrypted data – ensuring that sensitive data remains encrypted during storage and transmission, while complying with internal audit standards and schemes such as PCI DSS. Data encryption is the easier part, but allowing data to be transferred from an old key to an old key or upgraded to a more powerful encryption algorithm can be a major problem, especially without significant system downtime when transferring data. Translated. Sometimes it’s hard to easily track which data records are encrypted with which keys.

Banks make extensive use of hardware cryptography – encryption using keys stored in HSM, which are expensive and specialized devices. But because of the higher availability and resilience requirements of banking systems, more and more devices are needed to provide fail-safe systems that can withstand peak loads despite the high performance of modern HSM. Where theoretically one or two HSM is enough, problems with setting up and safely sharing devices mean that a large service application may need three times as much HSM to support it after various development, testing, and disaster recovery instances have been completed.

Even with efficiency and cost-saving use compared to HSM, the large number of applications supported by a large bank means that a wide range of basic HSM will be required: specialized applications, such as authorization payments, require specialized HSM. At the operational level, these banks need a clear understanding of their HSM area, showing performance and performance to ensure that the infrastructure is as efficient as possible. The more detailed data is available, the easier it is to identify and address bottlenecks. This monitoring and management system should allow different types of HSM (with different software APIs) to be combined with different manufacturers. The system should allow “hot” device replacements and support system scaling to maintain even very high performance requirements.

It is not enough to use only a secure system; banks have to prove that they are doing it. Like any bank, they are regularly audited by various agencies, including national and international card systems. Demonstrating compliance can be time-consuming and time-consuming even in simple projects and business. The specific security parameters used can be hidden deep in design documents and specifications, which takes time and effort to demonstrate to the auditor that the system actually works as stated in the project. Therefore, banks are obliged at the cryptographic level to demonstrate both the agreed security policy and its application.

However, as cryptography is increasingly used to protect data in most applications, non-security developers should be involved in protecting the data processed by their application. Instead of hiring additional specialists or risking project delay, most banks prefer to make security and encryption available to non-specialists. You need a solution that makes it easier and faster to buy software.

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